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During the course of a severe accident in a light water nuclear reactor, large amounts of
hydrogen can be generated and released into the containment during reactor core degra-
dation. Additional burnable gases [hydrogen (H2) and carbon monoxide (CO)] may be
released into the containment in the corium/concrete interaction. This could subsequently
raise a combustion hazard. As the Fukushima accidents revealed, hydrogen combustion
can cause high pressure spikes that could challenge the reactor buildings and lead to
failure of the surrounding buildings. To prevent the gas explosion hazard, most mitigation
strategies adopted by European countries are based on the implementation of passive
autocatalytic recombiners (PARs). Studies of representative accident sequences indicate
that, despite the installation of PARs, it is difficult to prevent at all times and locations, the
formation of a combustible mixture that potentially leads to local flame acceleration.
Complementary research and development (R&D) projects were recently launched to un-
derstand better the phenomena associated with the combustion hazard and to address the
issues highlighted after the Fukushima Daiichi events such as explosion hazard in the
venting system and the potential flammable mixture migration into spaces beyond the
primary containment. The expected results will be used to improve the modeling tools and
methodology for hydrogen risk assessment and severe accident management guidelines.
The present paper aims to present the methodology adopted by Institut de Radioprotection
et de Suˆrete Nucleaire to assess hydrogen risk in nuclear power plants, in particular French
nuclear power plants, the open issues, and the ongoing R&D programs related to hydrogen
distribution, mitigation, and combustion.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.1. Introduction
During severe accidents (SAs) in a nuclear power plant,
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MCCI in addition to hydrogen and other gases. The hydrogen
released into the containment via a reactor cooling system
(RCS) break or through the pressurizer safety valves or during
corium-concrete interaction is transported by convection
loops arising essentially from the released hot steam/gas or
initiated by condensation of steam on cold walls. Depending
on the level of mixing in the containment atmosphere, the
distribution of hydrogen can be homogeneous or stratified. If
considerable hydrogen stratification exists, local concentra-
tion of hydrogen and carbon monoxide may become a safety
concern because pockets of high hydrogen and carbon mon-
oxide concentrations may lead to combustion, flame acceler-
ation (FA), and eventually deflagration to detonation
transition (DDT) if the combustible mixture is ignited.
Furthermore, the hydrogen distribution may be affected by
safety systems such as spray or coolers that arewidely used in
many reactors to reduce the containment pressure and to
provide heat removal by steam condensation on water drop-
lets or cold surfaces. These measures may homogenize the
hydrogen distribution in the containment because of
enhanced mixing, but they can also significantly reduce the
steam concentration, which may lead to more combustible
gas mixture compositions.
Several methods [1] can be proposed to reduce the
hydrogen concentration in the containment: (1) deliberate
ignition, (2) consumption or recombination of hydrogen by
passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARs), (3) combining
ignition and recombination measures, (4) replacing oxygen
(air) with an inert gas [typically nitrogen (N2)] during normal
plant operation, (5) diluting the atmosphere by having, by
design, a large containment volume or by injecting an inert
gas, or (6) releasing hydrogen by containment venting.
Hydrogen risk management can be implemented by one or a
combination of the previous measures.
The choice of a mitigation strategy depends primarily on
the design of the containment. For pressurized water reactors
with a large dry containment, the strategy usually consists of
combining a large free volume to allow dilution, a high value
of the design pressure, and the use of mitigation means such
as PARs to consume hydrogen. This strategy is adopted in all
French pressurized water reactors. The implementation of
PARs were performed following rules and criteria that allow
(1) the reduction of the possibility of hydrogen accumulating
to flammable concentrations, (2) the minimization of the
flammable gaseous volume, and (3) the prevention of an in-
crease in the hydrogen levels from flammable to detonable
mixture concentrations. For French reactors, the adopted
criteria consist of keeping the hydrogen concentration mean
value below 8%vol to avoid complete combustion and the local
hydrogen concentration value under 10%vol to avoid FA.
These criteria were established to achieve the safety objective
set for French reactors, which is to practically eliminate situ-
ations that could yield an early containment failure with large
early releases. Hydrogen combustions that can challenge the
containment integrity consequently have to be avoided.
Therefore, for an auxiliary building, hydrogen combustion
should not challenge any safety function and system.
To evaluate the efficiency of suchmitigation strategies, the
methodology usually adopted is based on the prediction ofhydrogen distribution inside the containment while taking
into account the mitigation and safety systems effect and
the prediction of pressure and temperature loads that are
induced by the combustion. To cover all conceivable situa-
tions of a severe accident, including in- and ex-vessel phases,
research and development (R&D) efforts are still needed to
improve themethodology described in more detail in the next
paragraph.2. Hydrogen risk assessment methodology
To fulfill the requirements for the management of the
hydrogen risk in the nuclear power plant (NPP) mitigation
measures have been implemented in various NPPs contain-
ments to remove hydrogen or to control the hydrogen con-
centration inside the containment. The appropriate
mitigation measures is then designed, based on the results of
numerical simulations and dedicated experiments. The
methodology usually adopted to assess the hydrogen risk in
the reactor building and in the auxiliary buildings consists of
the following seven steps:
Step 1: Modeling of the plant design.
The starting point of any analysis is the selection of the
plant and geometrical modeling of the containment or the
auxiliary building. This step aims to describe adequately the
building geometry and volumes (including compartments)
and the safety system considered (e.g., PARs, spray, coolers),
which influence hydrogen distribution inside the reactor
containment or auxiliary building.
Step 2: Selection of relevant accident scenarios.
The representative or bounding in terms of hydrogen-
produced (mass and kinetics) severe accident scenarios for
hydrogen assessment are generally identified from SA code
calculations such as ACTEC calculations, Probabilistic Safety
Analysis (PSA) level 1 and 2 or other analyses. The evaluation
of the associated hydrogen production rates and release into
the reactor building is usually derived from parametric code
calculations and best estimates calculations considering
remaining uncertainties on hydrogen production processes.
Step 3: Evaluation of the containment atmosphere
condition.
During the accident transient, the temperature, pressure,
and gas composition in the different regions and volumes of
the containments are determined, and account for the pres-
ence of the mitigation systems. For this purpose, both lump
parameter (LP) and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) codes
are often used to simulate the transient. The CFD codes are
usually used for deeper analysis in short-term temporal win-
dows (e.g., hydrogen release phase, scenarios with local
accumulation, and expected stratification).
Step 4: Evaluation of the time evolution of a flammable
hydrogen-air-steam cloud.
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on its temperature, pressure, and composition as shown in
Fig. 1.
In practice, the point representing the mixture composi-
tion (hydrogen, air, steam) on the Shapiro diagram (Fig. 2) is
generally used to determine whether the mixture is
flammable. In this diagram, the zones of ignition (yellow)
and detonation (orange) are delimited by the exterior and
interior curves, respectively. The detonation limit is not an
intrinsic property; it is geometry-dependent. The red lines
are simplified combustion limits that are often used in codes.
Step 5: Evaluation of the propensity of a premixed flame to
propagate inside a building.
Under the effect of hydrodynamic instabilities and turbu-
lence (caused primarily by obstacles in the flame's path), an
initially laminar deflagration with a flame velocity of
approximately 1 m/s may accelerate. Fast combustion re-
gimes may also develop, and involve rapid deflagration (a few
hundred m/s), DDT, and detonation (greater than 1000 m/s).
These combustion regimes may generate high pressure loads
that could endanger the integrity of the containment or the
safety system's integrity. For this purpose, FA criteria (called
the “s” criteria) are used. The symbol s stands for the mix-
ture's expansion factor, which is the ratio of unburnt gas
versus burnt gas densities at constant pressure. It is an
intrinsic property of the mixture. The critical value s*, beyond
which FA is possible, depends on the initial gas composition
and temperature and flame stability.
Step 6: Evaluation of the pressure and thermal loads
generated by combustion.
Two configurations are distinguished:
1. If the FA criteria are not met, dynamic pressure loads are
excluded and the pressure load is evaluated by considering
the adiabatic isochoric complete combustion (AICC)
process.
2. If the FA criteria are met, the induced combustion loads is
evaluated using the most appropriate combustion models,
primarily using modeling implemented in CFD codes.Fig. 1 e Flammability limits diagrams of hydrogen (H2)/air mixtu
and 250 kPa. Green indicates no flame propagation; orange, upStep 7: Evaluation of the structure response to pressure
and thermal loads generated by combustion.
The structural resilience of the containment can be eval-
uated using dedicated dynamic structural response codes or
based on criteria used to judge whether the containment
integrity is maintained.
As mentioned previously, the evaluation of the hydrogen
risk is based on the use of validated tools for hydrogen dis-
tribution, hydrogen mitigation, and combustion and for the
assessment of the structure response to pressure and tem-
perature loadswhich result fromhydrogen combustion. In the
past, comprehensive R&D programs were launched to assess
and improve the predictability of such tools. In the following
paragraph, a short overview on the outcomes of these pro-
grams is discussed.3. Overview of recent international R&D
activities to improve hydrogen risk assessment
In the past few decades, extensive studies have been per-
formed and are still continuing in the international nuclear
community to assess the hydrogen risk in SAs. A large number
of projects sponsored by the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the European Com-
mission have been developed to address the remaining
research items on hydrogen andmany state-of-the-art reports
have been published on various aspects of hydrogen issues
(e.g., generation, distribution, combustion and mitigation). A
detailed overview on the project thus performed is described
in the OECD status report on Hydrogen Risk Management and
Codes published recently [25]. A brief overview of the recent
R&D activities related to hydrogen distribution, hydrogen
mitigation, and hydrogen combustion is provided.
3.1. Hydrogen distribution
In 1999, the OECD State Of the Art Report on Containment Thermal
Hydraulics and Hydrogen Distributionwas published [2] and gave
an overview on the code capabilities to predict pressure,
temperature, and gas concentration-distribution inside a
containment under severe accident conditions. The reportres between 25C and 150C at an initial pressure of 100 kPa
ward propagation; and red, full propagation.
Fig. 2 e Shapiro diagram for hydrogeneairesteam
mixtures at 1 bar and ambient. CO2, carbon dioxide; CO,
carbon monoxide; N2, nitrogen.
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1980s and 1990s that investigated phenomena related to
containment thermal hydraulics and hydrogen distribution.
Furthermore, this report discussed code development and
application activities, particularly ISP-23, ISP-29, ISP-35, and
ISP-39 benchmarks against the Heiss-Dampf Reaktor (HDR)
and Nuclear Power Engineering Corporation (NUPEC)
hydrogen mixing and distribution tests. The conclusions of
this report highlighted the remaining uncertainties from
experimental and models development and highlighted the
need for refined measures to validate lumped parameter and
CFD codes.
To resolve themost important remaining issues for SAs [3],
the European Commission (EC) established a 4-year Severe
Accident Research NETwork of Excellence (SARNET) project
in 2004. The containment behavior was one of the topics
addressed. The influence of containment sprays on
atmosphere behavior was investigated through benchmark
exercises based on experiments performed in TOSQAN
(IRSN, France) and MISTRA (CEA, France) facilities [4]. It was
concluded that the level of validation obtained was
encouraging for the use of spray modeling for risk analysis.
However, some more detailed investigations were
recommended to improve model parameters and decrease
the uncertainty for containment applications.
The International Standard Problem ISP-47 on Containment
Thermal-hydraulics [5] was later launched with the main
objective of assessing the capabilities of the LP and CFD
codes in the area of containment thermal hydraulics. Data
generated in three experimental facilities TOSQAN, MISTRA
and Thermal-hydraulic, Hydrogen, Aerosol and Iodine (THAI)
(Becker Technology, Eschborn, Germany) were used for
benchmarking codes in steady-state and transient
conditions. In addition to the pressure transients and gas
temperature fields studies in the former benchmark
exercises, detailed gas velocity and gas concentration (air,
steam and helium) fields were measured and analyzed forthe first time in such an exercise. It was concluded that
further work was needed in code development, in the
establishment of nasalization rules, and in code user
training to achieve more accurate predictive capabilities for
containment thermal hydraulics and atmospheric gas/steam
distribution. Uncertainties in the modeling of condensation,
gas stratification, and jet injection appeared to be the major
issues.
Following the ISP47 conclusions, the OECD-THAI project
was initiated with the aim of answering the open question
regarding the substitution of hydrogen with helium in
experimental tests and to assess the ability of LP and CFD
codes to predict the hydrogen stratification build up and
break-up. The investigation of the break-up of hydrogen
stratification in an light water reactor containment caused by
heat and mass sources and sinks, and by the effect of the
activation of a safety system (e.g., spray, heat source simu-
lating a recombiner, containment cooler) was also addressed
in the framework of the OECD/SETH2 Project. The experi-
mental investigations were performed in the multi-compart-
ment, large-scale PANDA (PSI, Villigen, Switzerland) and
Mitigation and Stratification (MISTRA) facilities, which are
equipped with CFD-grade instrumentation. The effect on the
hydrogen concentration of the sudden opening of hatches
separating a two-compartment containment was also inves-
tigated. The accompanying analytical activities performed
with various computational tools during the project have
already proven the relevance of the experimental database for
the assessment of advanced LP and CFD code capabilities.
More recently, the European Union and Russian State
Atomic Energy Corporation cofunded the 4-year ERCOSAM-
SAMARA [6] projects to investigate the hydrogen
concentration build up and stratification under stylized
postulated accident scenarios, and to investigate the
effectiveness of accident management systems (i.e., cooler,
spray, and PAR) in destabilizing a stratified hydrogen layer.
The experimental investigations were performed in the
PANDA, MISTRA, TOSQAN, and SPOT (JSC, Russian) facilities.
The use of different facilities allows insight on scaling
effects and to draw general conclusions that are not specific
to a particular containment design. In parallel to the
experimental program planning, pre- and post-test
calculations are being performed by the member countries
to assess the experimental conditions, evaluate the test
results, and verify codes/models currently used in reactor
safety analysis.
The aforementioned projects demonstrate the ability of
multicompartment and multidimensional computational
codes to predict gas mixing inside the reactor containment,
which allows their use for reactor application as in reports by
Bleyer et al. [7] and Caroli et al. [8]. However, some remaining
issues related to safety systems (spray, PARs, venting) effect
on gas mixture still need additional investigation. These
issues were highlighted also in the French Safety Authority
stress report following Fukushima accident [9].
3.2. Hydrogen mitigation
The IAEA report on Mitigation of Hydrogen Hazards in Water
Cooled Power Plants [10], published in 2001 summarized the
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conclusions of this report indicated that the choice of
measures to mitigate the hydrogen threat depend strongly
on the containment design. The implementation of PARs
was adopted in the western European countries with
different requirements and were based on several
experimental results described in a state of the art report on
hydrogen recombination [11].
More recently and in the framework of the OECD-THAI and
OECD-THAI2 projects [12,15], significant progress in knowl-
edge has been achieved on the behavior (e.g., onset of
recombination, recombination rate, and ignition potential) of
different PAR designs under severe accident typical condi-
tions. Oxygen starvation significantly reduces the recombi-
nation rate. A highly important result is that PAR ignition
potential is limited to a relatively small area of mixture com-
positions in the air-hydrogen steam ternary diagram that are
capable of providing the high catalyst temperatures required
for ignition. Furthermore, detailed models were recently
developed at the IRSN and implemented in SPARK code [13].
The use of this model for the analysis of REKO [14] and THAI
[15] experiments allows the determination of the ignition
limits induced by PARs. The ongoing collaboration between
IRSN and JULICH are permitting the improvement of the
SPARK model [13], the investigation of the effect of carbon
monoxide on hydrogen recombination [16] and the effect of
fire products on recombination start up.
Nevertheless, remaining issues regarding PARs behavior in
challenging conditions still need further investigation. These
challenging conditions concern PARs efficiency in gasmixture,
composed of hydrogen, carbon monoxide from MCCI, steam
and low oxygen, and correspond to the late phase of a severe
accident. Furthermore, the overall flow conditions inside the
containment in the course of a severe accident may be quite
different from a quiescent atmosphere. In general, the corre-
sponding flow patterns will be strongly influenced by the
location of the release and by components and installations.
Especially close to the containment walls, a downward-
directed flow is expected to occur in the early accident phase.
Because many PARs installed inside a light water reactor are
mounted at the containment walls, these PARs will have to
establish the internal upward chimney flow against the
downward local containment flow. Another relevant issue
never investigated before in detail is the influence of the PAR
location on the efficiency of the flammable gases conversion.
3.3. Hydrogen combustion
The OECD State of the Art Report on Flame Acceleration and
Deflagration to Detonation Transition [17] addressed the key issue
of hydrogen combustion that may occur as a result of SA in
NPPsdnamely, to predict the type of combustion (e.g., a
slow flame, a fast turbulent flame, or a detonation). Despite
significant advances in understanding FA and DDT, which
had been obtained between 1990 and 1999, the knowledge of
FA and DDT is largely empirical and numerical simulation is
unable to provide a truly predictive capability for DDT. Many
situations arise in which the possibility of FA and DDT
cannot be ruled out, but there are no means to predict
whether these will actually occur.Based on these conclusions, the national ENACCEF [18], the
European (HYCOM [9] and SARNET [19]) and the OECD projects
(ISP49 [20], THAI [12] and THAI2 [21]) were launched with the
aim to enhance the knowledge of the flame propagation
mechanisms. The results of these projects contribute to
enhance the level of knowledge on flammability limits [22],
on the FA criteria in semi-confined configuration [19] and in
nonhomogenous mixtures [22]. The effect of spray on flame
propagation has also been partially addressed [23,24].
The lessons learned from these projects show that the
computer codes are able to reproduce the pressure generated
by combustion. On the other hand, they do notwell predict the
flame propagation regimes as observed in the experiments.
These are the situations in which the turbulence generated by
the interaction between the flame and obstacles is sufficiently
high to bring about a transition towards detonation, aswas the
case for the explosion that occurred inUnit 3 of the Fukushima
NPP. These exercises also highlighted the following:
1. The need for turbulence intensity measurements in fresh
gases. These data are necessary for turbulent combustion
models validation. To date, this information has been
missing in most known experiments.
2. The need to study the scaling effect from experimental
facilities towards reactor application. The differences be-
tween the experimental installations and the reactor
containment dimensions (for example a factor of 50,000
between ENACCEF facility of ICARE and the containment of
the 900 MWe reactor) do not allow the extrapolation of the
lessons learned from the experiments towards the reactor
containment. In fact, the scale effect can at the same time
accentuate instabilities and decrease the thermal losses
(i.e. the losses of the energy of the flame, thus its deceler-
ation, and even for its smothering on smaller scale) and
thus promote the acceleration of the flame.
3. In addition to the previous statement, issues regarding
flame propagation still need further investigation. These
remaining issues concern specifically the determination of
flammability limits and FA criteria in MCCI representative
conditions (e.g., low oxygen concentration, steam,
hydrogen, carbon dioxide, carbonmonoxide, nitrogen) and
the effect of safety systems (e.g., spray, venting) operation
on flame propagation.4. Ongoing and foreseen R&D activities
In spite of the accomplished efforts of national, European, and
international projects to apprehend the whole of the physical
phenomena related to hydrogen risk, gaps of knowledge have
been indicated [1]. These gaps deal with distribution and
combustion of hydrogen, and the dynamic response of
containment structures to pressure loads because of
hydrogen combustion. This statement had been highlighted
recently by the French Nuclear Safety Authority in a report
[9] regarding complementary safety assessments after the
Fukushima accidents. This report also underlines the need
to evaluate the risk of hydrogen deflagration in the fuel
building to determine practical and organizational
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enhance the accident management.
4.1. MYTHYGENE project
Based on these observations, a work programwas proposed in
the MITHYGENE project to improve the hydrogen risk
assessment models and safety management procedures. This
program launched in 2013 aims to address the gaps of
knowledge concerning the distribution and combustion of
hydrogen and its effect on the containment structures. New
measurement techniques of hydrogen concentrations in the
reactor containment will be developed within the project.
Thus, the knowledge gained will be used to improve the ac-
cident management guidelines (SAMG) and the predictability
of the computer codes used for safety assessment.
The MITHYGENE project is funded by the French Research
agency within a framework set by the French national pro-
gram, Investissements d'Avenir, and supported by industry
partners. In addition to the IRSN, the project coordinator,
institutional partners, industry, and academia are involved in
this project. Institution and university are CEA and ICARE, and
the German institute is JU¨LICH. The industrial partners are
ELTA, AREVA, EDF, and AIR-LIQUIDE.
The MITYHGENE Project offers the unique opportunity to
study in a concerted way all the topics dealing with the study
of the hydrogen risk, to fill the existing gaps of knowledge and
to improve safety strategies in nuclear and industrial
installations.
The MITHYGENE project aims at improving the predict-
ability of the numerical tools used for hydrogen risk evalua-
tion, and also at designing and qualifying a prototype of in situ,
real time and multipoint instrumentation of gas measure-
ment. The results of these actions will be used to interpret the
events of Fukushima and to propose an improvement of the
mitigation devices and procedures of severe accident
management.
For this purpose, the MITHYGENE project includes funda-
mental and applied topics:
1. Fundamental topics aim at improvingmodels for hydrogen
related phenomena and at developing in situ and severe
accident compatible diagnostics for gas concentrations
measurement. Four research topics are then addressed:
i. The purpose of the first topic is to perform experi-
mental and numerical studies of hydrogen distribution
by taking into account the effect of the mitigation
means. The results of these studies will improve the
capacity of the computer codes to predict situations not
yet addressed by national and international programs.
ii. The second topic aims to perform experimental and
numerical studies of hydrogen flame propagation into
gaseous atmosphere containing water vapor and water
droplets at different initial conditions. The experiments
thus performed will fill the lack of data on hydrogen
flame propagation in a wet medium. The synthesis of
the experimental data will be used to enhance the FA
criteria, to improve the models of combustion imple-
mented in the computer codes, and to extend their
validation domain.iii. The third topic aims to perform experimental and nu-
merical studies of the concrete and metallic structures
response to hydrogen explosion loads. Various loads
corresponding to various modes of combustion will
then be studied. The results will be used to improve the
knowledge on dynamic effects generated by combus-
tion on concrete and metallic structures.
iv. The fourth topic aims to develop a prototypical device
for in situ and real time measurement of gas composi-
tion inside the reactor containment in a SA.
2. The applied topics objective is the enhancement of safety
measures related to hydrogen risk based on the knowledge
gained from fundamental topics. Three tasks will be
performed:
i. Make industrial the prototype developed in the frame-
work of WP 4.
ii. Improve the practices and doctrines adopted by man-
ufacturers to prevent hydrogen explosion risk in their
own installations.
iii. Provide a complete explanation of the hydrogen ex-
plosion that occurred in the Fukushima Daiichi NPP.4.2. THAI3 Proposal
The THAI 3 Proposal aims to complement the objectives
addressed in framework of MITHYGENE project. Hence, flame
propagation in complex multi-compartment geometry will be
investigated. In addition, PARs operation under reverse flow
will be studied to provide complementary data to the four
results of REKO.
4.3. HYCOSAM Proposal
The HYCOSAM Proposal aims to investigate the MCCI-related
release of H2/CO and its distribution: H2/CO mitigation in the
rest of the containment in which already several hundred
kilograms of hydrogen, if not consumed otherwise, will be
available, and H2/CO combustion in representative SA condi-
tions. Hence, the effect of venting on gas distribution, the PAR
operation under representative MCCI conditions, and flame
propagation in related atmosphere will be addressed.5. Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to present the methodology for
hydrogen risk assessment and the related R&D programs.
Thus, an overview of the recent national, OECD and European
R&D programs dealing with hydrogen distribution, hydrogen
mitigation and hydrogen combustion is discussed. These
projects aim to enhance the level of confidence of the safety
tools used at IRSN by improving their validity domains which
allows their use in safety analysis.
Despite the effort, uncertainties and lack of knowledge on
PAR behavior and flame propagation mechanism still exist.
For this purpose, the national MITHYGENE project was
launched and proposals were made (i.e., THAI3 in the frame-
work of OECD and HYCOSAM in the framework of the H2020-
European call).
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